Whether we work in insurance, emergency services, public sector, transport planning or road safety we want all our roads to be as safe as possible and for collisions and injuries to be kept to a minimum. The Government released road safety statistics for 2021 in September 20221. This showed a headline reduction in fatalities on our roads compared to 2019. On the face of it this is great news, with a decrease of 11% from pre-pandemic levels. For casualties the news was more positive with again an 11% reduction overall compared to 2019. Yet the whole picture is not a positive one as the rate of fatalities per billion vehicle miles was higher than previously.
We can contrast this with our own claims data from our book of police risks. Given that RMP provides motor insurance for around two thirds of the UK’s police fleets, the insight we have is not only unique, but also insightful in the context of risk and police fleets. As an insurance industry there is a moral responsibility for us all to look at what we do, whether within an organisation or as consultants to constantly review and manage the risks.
What we have witnessed in the last three years is an uplift in road traffic collisions that led to catastrophic injuries, with anticipated claims costs of nearly £26 million. These are concentrated in a handful of losses (two of the claims account for £22.5 million of this sum). Invariably the accidents happened when the vehicles in question were responding to an emergency call.
Large losses however are nothing new, with 2011 offering us our largest ever settled motor claim. This was a police event, which was settled in 2022 for over £13 million including damages and costs. It is the frequency of large losses that is different today, with one key reason being the ability of medicine to treat a victim of a serious road traffic collision.
This claims profile led RMP to undertake our most extensive fleet reviews of police accounts in 2022, to see if we can reduce the frequency of large claims coming through into our book. This is easier said than done when we are not embedded in customer organisations, and do not know individual drivers.
As with any review it is important to consider the issues, then tailor recommendations to operations and organisations. In general, we found that police fleets
do not consider themselves ‘fleets’ as would say a council or commercial company, also they have ‘police drivers’ not just drivers. Yet that is exactly what they are, regardless of the operational requirement, and police forces should follow the same fundamental principles to manage road risks.
Apart from moral and statutory responsibilities to behave in ways that do not put people in harm’s way, there is also a huge reputational risk for emergency services. There is even more pressure on drivers, thanks in part to social media. Anything they do is splashed across social media and newspaper pages before they have returned to their yards. Many non-blue light drivers see themselves as ‘experts’ and voice their opinions, with criticism levelled at all aspects of police driving.
Police drivers are highly trained and subject to regular reassessment every three to five years depending on their level of qualification. This can range from a ‘basic’ driver, ‘standard’ through to ‘advanced’. A basic driver has no authority to use emergency equipment, which applies to most police staff who need to drive for work. A standard response driver is trained to a level defined by the College of Policing and uses a certain performance level vehicle. While those who are trained to the advanced level drive high performance vehicles. These are involved in pursuits and specific manoeuvres such as controlled stops known as TPAC (tactical pursuit and containment training).
Historically there has been a knee jerk reaction from organisations, (police included) that if a collision occurs, the driver is sent to training for reassessment. For basic drivers the College of Policing allows individual forces the discretion to decide if an on-road assessment is required. Through conducting our review of over
half of UK police forces this year, almost all, without exception, have decided not to do so. This is principally due to budgets and staffing issues within driver training departments. COVID-19 prevented training, resulting in a long backlog. It is difficult to get officers trained to at least standard level to be able to do their role more effectively, and the increased national recruitment programme adds pressure to the system.
These reasons are completely understandable, but how does any organisation know the drivers (whether new officers or staff) are safe on the road? Possessing a driving licence is not an automatic indication a driver is competent. They may not have driven since passing the test, may not be familiar with an automatic gear box rather than manual (and increasingly vice versa) or even an electronic handbrake compared to a manual one. If we do not check, we will not know and have nothing to benchmark standards against.
That being said, on-road driving assessments for those who for example are there for a post-collision intervention, are not of benefit. We have all done it: the moment we know someone is watching or assessing us we drive perfectly! It does not tell us what has really gone on. When an individual modifies an aspect of their behaviour knowing they are being observed it is known as the Hawthorn Effect2.
It is right to assume that advanced drivers have exceptional driving skills, performed at a high level. Interestingly though studies have shown these drivers in many cases have a ‘sense of invulnerability’ and feel collisions are part and parcel of the role they undertake. Many believe they would not be involved in a blameworthy collision, often assigning blame elsewhere to those considered less competent in their view.
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 applies here as with any organisation. Emergency services should have robust licence checking, often through third-party services, to ensure drivers have the correct category and are not in danger of losing their licence through accumulation of points. It is recommended this is done every six months for those with no points and more frequently for others, using a risk-based approach. If checked annually a driver could lose their licence, receive a six-month ban, get the licence back in the same year and the organisation is none the wiser.
Drivers are asked to read number plates in the yard annually to ensure their eyesight meets minimum legal requirements and, one would hope, exceed this. Yet police forces rely on driver self-declaration for driving infringements and medical issues. Checks on a licence may be made on turning up for a driving course but these can be up to five years apart. Those remaining at the basic grade such as police staff are checked at induction, which is almost certainly the last time anyone conducts a physical check. Many admitted it is unlikely any spot checks would be made. The police have a code of ethics and for those working within the police it is possible to be held accountable by professional standards.
At the very basic level we should ask drivers why they think something happened. This should not be factual, as if writing a witness statement, but we need to ask how a driver felt at the time. For example, are there any additional home or work issues, what were they thinking about, or were they distracted? This gives us the starting point for a conversation to provide behavioural insight.
There are risk profiling assessments that (subject to training) can be applied to either standard response or advanced drivers. A series of questions provides an insight into a driver’s personality or coping mechanisms with driving risks, leading to coached conversation to improve individual safety. The one size fits all approach is known not to work and these assessments give more detail on influences and establish if the driver has appropriate strategies. These behavioural factors are given a high to low-risk rating, benchmarked against everyone who may have completed an assessment in the past, and can show if the driver is poor at hazard monitoring, prone to fatigue, risk inevitability, anxiety and confrontation for instance. If drivers know what motivates or influences them, it is possible to help manage with more personal interventions where there is individual buy-in. This is available to ambulance and fire services and is specifically designed around their operations and risks, which are task focused.
To be proactive, these types of tools should be used before an incident occurs so that any negative or positive behavioural traits can be addressed as a preventative measure. If an organisation chooses not to address driver incidents because they are deemed to be minor, the Pareto principle3 may come into play. This suggests that 20% of drivers could be 80% of the problem. Left alone that small incident could escalate into the large claim we all strive to avoid.
It is not uncommon for general fleets to have telematics fitted to help monitor the driving style of their drivers, such as harsh cornering or braking. This can aid with fuel economy such as idling times or mpg, and can indicate both vehicle faults and poor driving. Interestingly there are some forces that do not have telematics fitted in their operational vehicles. It can provide rich data in relation to trends particularly when investigating collisions and in conjunction with camera footage whether through automatic number plate recognition or dash cam. A camera will indicate what a driver is doing even if their driving style appears to be acceptable. More experienced drivers will conduct tasks subconsciously which frees up cognitive, visual and physical resources to engage in non-driving activities such as distractions (for example, eating and phone use).
In order to solve the wider issue of police vehicle collisions we need to drill down into the data, but we have to capture first. This can be through telematics and then for claims reporting to ask the right questions. For example, police vehicles come in two broad operational types (covert is a third but by their very nature they
look like any other vehicle on the road). Marked vehicles have blue and yellow Battenburg markings alongside the emergency warning systems of blue lights, sirens and flashing headlights. Unmarked police vehicles have no livery but have discreet emergency warning systems with blue lights fitted in the grill.
A large piece of research4 considered the effect emergency warning systems have on the outcome of a collision. For either a marked or unmarked vehicle responding to an emergency, but not displaying emergency warning systems at the time and subsequently involved in a collision, there was no difference in liability between either the police or civilian driver. For an unmarked vehicle operating the emergency warning systems, all liability subsequently fell on the civilian driver. This is not unsurprising as in all cases the vehicle was evading being stopped so a deliberate act of damage.
It would be logical to think that a marked vehicle is highly visible and therefore collisions could be proportionally reduced. Yet the data showed that if
the police driver switched on the emergency systems, police liability increased by 78% for the use of flashing headlights, 69% by activating the blue lights and 120% in the use of sirens5. This suggests that for both marked and unmarked vehicles the issue is not the livery but due to something happening to the driver. It is likely that the police driver rationalises that they are indeed driving a highly visible vehicle, with emergency warning systems operating, and the other motorist must have seen or heard them approaching. In this instance the police driver makes progress, but the gap has not opened as quickly as expected, resulting in a collision.
From an insurance perspective we would ask additional questions when gathering data, such as the type of markings or what emergency warning systems were being used prior to, and at the time of, the collision.
In the insurance industry we are the first to recognise that police risks represent a considerable exposure. They easily sit within the upper percentile of fleet
risks, and it goes with the territory. It is impossible to police in modern Britain and not be exposed to risk of catastrophic claims. Indeed, the data probably points to how well such fleets are driven when you consider the nature of the activity and accident frequency.
Nevertheless, that does not mean we shouldn’t try to reduce the frequency of large losses, understand better their causes and consider practical solutions. We can look at ways in which fleets and drivers can be better managed, and how we can help create a more embedded culture of safety. It is incumbent on us all, whatever our role, to push for better standards and to promote better safety, and ultimately strive for fewer accidents.
Disclaimer
This note is not intended to give legal or financial advice, and, accordingly, it should not be relied upon for such. It should not be regarded as a comprehensive statement of the law and or market practice in this area. In preparing this note we have relied on information sourced from third parties and we make no claims as to the completeness or accuracy of the information contained herein. It reflects our understanding as at 14th July 2021, but you will recognise that matters concerning COVID-19 are fast changing across the world. You should not act upon information in this bulletin nor determine not to act, without first seeking specific legal and/or specialist advice. Our advice to our clients is as an insurance broker and is provided subject to specific terms and conditions, the terms of which take precedence over any representations in this document. No third party to whom this is passed can rely on it. We and our officers, employees or agents shall not be responsible for any loss whatsoever arising from the recipient’s reliance upon any information we provide herein and exclude liability for the content to fullest extent permitted by law. Should you require advice about your specific insurance arrangements or specific claim circumstances, please get in touch with your usual contact at Risk Management Partners.
Risk Management Partners Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority. Registered office: The Walbrook Building, 25 Walbrook, London EC4N 8AW. Registered in England and Wales. Company no. 2989025
References
1Road accidents and safety statistics, Department for Transport
2Hawthorne Revisited, H.A Landsberger
3The Pareto principle, Wikipedia
4Making sense of invulnerability at work – a qualitative study of police drivers, Safety Science
5How do emergency vehicle markings and warning systems influence the interaction between emergency and civilian drivers? Dr Sandra Macdonald-Ames, Loughborough University
ALARM Stronger
This article was originally published in the January 2023 edition of stronger, the ALARM journal. ALARM is a not-for-profit membership association that has supported risk management professionals for over 30 years. They provide members with outstanding support to achieve professional excellence, including education, training, guidance, networking, and industry recognition for best practice across risk management and related services.
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