




Risk control

Social Engineering



In partnership with



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Introduction

For public sector organisations, every pound lost through fraudulent activity is a pound that could have potentially been spent on essential front line service delivery. That is why proactive steps should be taken to safeguard against all forms of fraud presented by internal or external sources.

In recent years we have become increasingly aware of the rise of payment fraud with cyber criminals looking to capitalise on distracted and busy minds. Every day could be considered as an opportunity for fraud as employees are looking to 'tie up loose ends,' meet deadlines etc. Criminals take advantage of busy periods and look to manipulate employees into cutting corners, ignoring policies, and breaching regulations so that monies are paid into fraudster's bank accounts.

This activity is now translating into significant losses and claims.

What is driving this behaviour is hard to pinpoint with certainty, however, dynamic operating models where increased numbers of key employees may be working from home, even on a part-time basis, has certainly created more opportunities for fraudsters as systems of control may have become a little more stretched.

Although unrelated, anyone with a mobile phone who has undertaken on-line shopping in the recent past is likely to have received a fraudulent text message at some point claiming that a delivery is being held up. The solution offered is to click the link contained within the message. Doing so would only be in the criminal's best interest.

All of this goes to demonstrate that as technology becomes more sophisticated, so do the techniques and concepts deployed by the fraudsters.

What is Social Engineering?

Social engineering is effectively the art of manipulating people so they give up confidential information or are duped into making a payment directly into a fraudster's account.

The types of information these criminals are seeking can vary, but they are usually trying to trick people into giving them sensitive passwords or bank information, or access to an individual's computer so that they can access passwords and bank information¹.

It is usually committed via telephone in combination with email. The criminal will seek to impersonate individuals and organisations and will often create a need for urgency and the threat of penalties if the task is not completed quickly.

Criminals use social engineering tactics because it is usually easier to exploit a person's natural inclination to trust than it is to penetrate cyber-security systems.

Three-Tiered Approach

The three levels advocated are not new but when tailored specifically around a particular risk theme or hazard, in this case social engineering fraud, they can be used in a synchronised way that optimises risk management efforts.

There is always a cost-benefit consideration when investing limited resources, so this approach adds more weight to the benefit side of the scales.

The three levels to consider are:

1. Operational Risk Controls: systems and supervision working together
2. Cultural Factors: strong leadership and open communication
3. Oversight: robust second and third lines of defence

Operational Risk Controls

Each local authority is responsible for establishing appropriate mechanisms to manage the risk of fraud within their own authority. This includes policies, systems and processes and the focus is normally two-fold – preventative fraud activity focussed on intelligence monitoring to detect fraud hotspots, and reactive counter fraud work including investigations and sanctions.

Third Party ('Push Payment') fraud has been on the rise since 2014 when a well-publicised vishing scam enabled by rogue employees of a UK mainstream bank reached the news. It is often underpinned by cybercrime, data breaches, and social engineering, so cyber controls and data protection are important, but well-educated people and robust payment controls can thwart attempts to convince someone to pay monies into the wrong hands.

Essential controls to build into procedures are as follows:

1. Obtain evidence of bank account details at the outset of a new payee relationship showing the name of the payee / supplier on, for instance, a bank statement, paying in slip, bank card etc. Making this a part of a new payee on-boarding / due diligence processes should result in this swiftly becoming second nature. Getting this information early removes a pressure point which criminals can exploit when things may become rushed, and people may be tempted to cut corners. Changing these later becomes a big deal so should be an automatic warning sign for anyone asked to do this
2. Be vigilant of fake emails. Spoof emails are the most common means of perpetrating payment fraud at present but can be detected by hovering over the sender's address to look for subtle changes - often a single digit such as an 'l' to a '1' which often will not be spotted in a small font. Whilst poor language and grammar used to be obvious warning

signs, fraudsters are now more sophisticated at mimicking the individual they are impersonating

3. Be suspicious of any communication about bank accounts at any stage, but especially when advised close to the point when monies are about to be transferred. Whether it is a confirmation 'just to remind you,' a change of account, or a request to split funds across different accounts to share proceeds or deal with other pressing needs, any contact about bank details should be an immediate red flag triggering the following checks:
 - Contact the payee using a trusted telephone number obtained from the payee at the on-boarding stage. Never rely on them calling "to confirm their email" as it could be the fraudster impersonating an authentic person or company. Similarly, a change to contact details should be treated with caution and verified by another means; Needless to say, this safety call should be treated as high priority
 - Obtain evidence of the changes by going back to Step 1 and ensuring that the new details are obtained in person or by secure delivery and match the exact name of the payee / supplier. Documents appended to an email are easy to fake including letter headed paper and online style bank statements. Printed bank statements, paying in slips, a picture of a corporate / debit card, the confirmation of new telecoms / email account etc. are harder to fake but should be treated with caution. A telephone or video call to capture a picture of the new evidence via a trusted contact is the safest bet
 - Fraud proof the payment request / authorisation form (or equivalent) with adequate control stages to be signed off as completed so that the process is never reliant on a single person performing their job perfectly 100% of the time – which may be an unrealistic expectation. Risk controls need to allow for human error by adding layers that reduce the likelihood of error. The recent frauds we have seen have been successful as such layers were not part of the everyday process, or were, but not followed
 - Limit Immediate Faster Payments (IFP) to nominal sums for established payees. Please avoid use of this method for transfers of larger funds especially to one-off payees. IFP is favoured by criminals as the transfer is completed in seconds, with the monies then available to be moved to other accounts very rapidly, decreasing the chance of recovery. Evidence from increasing payment fraud shows there is a much better chance of blocking payments to criminals when CHAPS (or BACS) has been used. If all else fails, this could help in recovering some of the monies already transferred to a rogue account

Review

Organisations need to review and update the following:

- Written policies and procedures
- Forms and checklists used for making payments
- Quality / risk control gates in workflow screens
- Training and education materials
- Any checklist that is used with suppliers, projects, beneficiaries, files etc. to manage process flow

Such updates should appear as standing agenda items for relevant meetings, with team leaders at every level ensuring that time is given to discussion of these issues to ensure successful implementation of new and updated policies

Payment Request Controls

Strengthen financial risk management frameworks by ensuring there is separation in payment roles within the organisation. No one individual should be able to set up a new payee account and make a payment without peer review and / or supervisor sign off. The following describes a three-step process but two tiers, or 'dual-authorisation' is the minimum recommended.

1. Requester

Provides the transaction details (e.g. instruction / authorisation, evidence of receipt / completion and / or invoice) and attaches evidence of the client bank account, showing clearly whether these are originals or changed details. Any changes to originals must be accompanied by replacement bank account evidence and a record showing discussion with the payee in a call instigated by a staff member, using a trusted phone number used previously

2. Authoriser

Confirms they have conducted a functional verification of the documents to ensure they meet procedural requirements as Stage 1. Signing without checking is not verification and only serves to reinforce previous errors and omissions.

3. Releaser

Confirms that all evidence is adequate and accurate prior to release of funds and that no anomalies in evidence, client names, or banking arrangements are apparent. Requests for splitting monies across accounts, transferring beneficiary, overseas payments etc. are often factors in fraud cases

Stages II and III may be reversed and stages I) & II) or II) and III) may be combined. Critical is at least dual authorisation in whatever form best fits the payment process.

4. Anomalies

In evidence, payee name(s) or banking arrangements, no matter how seemingly minor, should be escalated in line with protocol. If an escalation protocol is not in place, one should be written and promoted, and staff trained accordingly.

Cultural Controls

Leadership and communication are vital to the success of fraud prevention controls and any risk or quality campaign message can easily be lost if the organisation's culture does not support it. Influencing factors include:

1. **Strong Messaging** - Leaders at all levels need to deliver messages face-to-face to explain objectives and approaches when policies or procedures are introduced or updated. Cascading of messages through all levels needs to be effective and not be diluted in the process. If the procedure requires sharing and acknowledgement of new and updated policies or procedures, email can be satisfactory but is not as effective in making sure everyone is on the same page as face-to-face discussions
2. **Clear Expectations** - All personnel should understand that compliance with fraud prevention measures and the consequences of failure to do so are built into disciplinary processes. This should be consistent for everyone so employment contracts, consultant contracts, partnership agreements etc. may all need consideration in this context
3. **Speak-Up Culture** - Individuals need encouragement to speak up and the confidence that that they will be listened to and supported so a culture of transparency and trust is essential. Challenges to unusual requests (from someone within or external to the organisation) should be fully supported. Leadership messages on speaking up need to permeate throughout the organisation to be successful, so organisations must take care not to let these messages be watered down or smothered completely through the management hierarchy. Talk openly about concerns to clear the air about ignoring red flags, dealing with difficult payees, or even bullying colleagues as they can all undermine controls by pushing staff to cut corners when the pressure is on. As a last resort, official 'Whistleblowing' channels should be available
4. **Comprehensive Training Programmes** - This should include induction, regular refreshers, risk-based themes etc. E-Learning has its place, but more traditional face-to-face training is often better as it allows people to ask questions, voice concerns, challenge approaches, and deal with nuances in distinct functions as there invariably will be. Social engineering awareness should be included in organisational training programmes

5. **Reminders** - Ongoing reminders keep social engineering, fraud prevention, and risk management on the agenda, at all levels - featuring in scheduled team discussions can prove beneficial. There is no shortage of stories in the media to use as hooks to keep the subject of social engineering in the forefront of people's minds and to provide new angles and insights as fraudsters become more sophisticated in their approaches

6. **Culture** – Finally, consider how each of these cultural aspects are delivered in the context of existing policies, procedures, and audit programmes to assess where any improvements might be made

Oversight

Independent checks should be in place to give assurance that day-to-day controls are being followed. Effective management systems will also aim for structured review and improvement.

It may not be possible to implement all the following but the more defence layers are implemented, the less likely fraud will become.

1. In-Line Compliance Checks

Checklists, data fields and control gates can all be used to prompt compliance with agreed procedures and to identify when a step has not been completed. Having compliance checks built into the process provides useful feedback in real-time rather than after the fact

2. Financial Spot Checks

Random checks on processes, parts of processes, or individual higher risk payees / payments can add another defence layer. Knowledge that these happen irregularly and unannounced can also act as a deterrent to would-be in-house fraudsters

3. Independent File Reviews

Any process of independent review e.g. on specific projects, suppliers, cases etc. can be adapted to include checks to ensure that specified fraud control measures are being followed at an individual level. Review and update the checklist in line with procedure updates (annually) to ensure it keeps pace with changes in fraud prevention controls

4. Internal Process Audit

Ensure the scope of internal audits covers all processes and controls required to prevent fraud. Sometimes there are organisational blind spots where auditors are excluded. Finance and HR can be two such areas as records may be viewed as sensitive. If processes are documented, they can be audited. If they are not documented, then the scope of the documented management system may need to be reconsidered to cover all risks

5. External Process Audit

Any third-party auditors should be considering risk control systems in the context of the current business environment. Social engineering and fraud are now well-known hazards and ones that are not receding so fraud prevention controls should be included in the scope of any external process audit programmes

6. External Financial Audit

Understand what any Financial Auditors are doing in this regard already and what might be done to extend the scope of this final layer of independent review. It might include specific fraud prevention advice, more in-depth risk-based reviews, training, and the use of forensic software

QBE Crime Prevention Toolkit

QBE have devised a special on-line questionnaire which can help public sector bodies understand their exposures in more detail and assists with gap analysis. Once completed, the participant will receive a report summarising the findings. The facility is available to all clients where QBE insure Crime cover. For more details, please contact your RMP Account Director.

Summary

Remember...

Training for all relevant staff is critical. Share this guidance note by email, but make sure an opportunity for open discussion is also created so people can ask questions.

Raising awareness, lowering automatic trust, encouraging people to be curious and empowering them to challenge requests (even on suspicion alone) are all crucial to preventing social engineering fraud.

Changing a bank is a significant task and should not usually involve a last-minute notification. If the newly nominated bank is not a mainstream organisation, it is likely they will not have 'confirmation of payee' (CoP) in place, which can be a red flag. Bear in mind though, even with CoP in place, it can give false positives for long payee names that are the same at the start but have a subtle change on the end that is not picked up by the CoP system so always check.

Evidence for changes should always be requested (paying-in slip, bank card, official bank statement) showing the sort-code, account number and name of the account holder all on one source of information. The name must match the existing suppliers and not be subtly different (e.g. with a 'trading as' added). If requested at that stage, it may be enough to deter less committed fraudsters. No action should be taken until the evidence is received.

If the request is by email - look at the sender's full email address - is it the same as the payee's or a spoof version. Just hover over the address without clicking on it to see the real email address rather than that which is displayed.

In any case, after such a request is made, refer to the details held for that supplier / beneficiary, use a trusted phone number, and contact them to verify - speak to someone already known if possible. Do not use a phone number provided on the request to change the bank details. Fraudsters have realised that people talking directly to each other thwarts their fraud endeavours so increasingly they are attempting to have contact details (email address and / or phone numbers) amended on systems just prior to requesting changes to bank details. If that request goes unchallenged and the central record is updated, the safety call made to verify the change in bank details is only destined to fail as it will be answered by the fraudster.

To summarise: any request to change a payee's details must be treated with the utmost suspicion.

There needs to be at least two layers of verification - no single individual should be able to authorise such a change. Both should check the evidence and sign-off that the phone call to a trusted contact has taken place. Line manager sign-off should be sought where any doubt remains.

If fraud takes place or is detected and prevented, it should always be reported to Action Fraud. They might not respond individually or be able to solve each case, but they can build a profile to prevent in future attacks.

Fraudsters will try and exploit the vulnerability of local authorities whilst their attention is diverted and focussed on continuing to deliver front-line services with reduced capacity and restricted movements and / or operating capability.

Scams and frauds come in all shapes and sizes and all organisations are at risk. Local authorities always need to be alive to, and prepared for, attempts to defraud them out of vital financial resources.

Message of Thanks

A message of thanks to QBE Risk Solutions, European Operations Financial Lines for their assistance in the production of this guidance document.

Reference

1. What is Social Engineering? Available at: <https://www.webroot.com/gb/en/resources/tips-articles/what-is-social-engineering?srsId=AfmBOoqfKGkPUccLM-mBasqbuDDuo0B264GVpl6igy21ndSqn2XluxXs>

Further information

For access to further RMP Resources you may find helpful in reducing your organisation's cost of risk, please access the RMP Resources or RMP Articles pages on our website. To join the debate follow us on our LinkedIn page.

Get in Touch

For more information, please contact your broker, RMP risk control consultant or account director.



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